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1) Introduction and Background 
This paper reports on the deliberations of a special plenary panel (‘table ronde’) 
session organised on behalf of the UK’s Monetary Macro, Finance Research 
Group (MMFRG) at the 31st International Symposium of the Groupement de 
Recherche Européen (GdRE): Monnaie, Banque et Finance (MBF) on 19th June 
2014  by Andy Mullineux (Bournemouth University) with the help of other 
members of the Scientific Committee for the conference, particularly Antoine 
Parent, the local organiser and Jean-Bernard Chatelain, President of the GdRE 
(MBF). They invited Laurent Clerc (Banque de France) to join the panel, which 
was chaired by Andy.  The other panellists were Philip Davis (Brunel University 
and National Institute of Economic and Social Research, NIESR), Peter Sinclair 
(University of Birmingham), and Karen Braun-Munzinger (Bank of England). 
The ‘double entendre’ implied by the chosen title was intentional in the sense 
that it asked both whether the banking system has been repaired by regulatory 
initiatives initiated since the 2007-9 Global (or Great, as it is increasingly and 
more geographically accurately, referred to) Financial Crisis, or ‘GFC’ in the 
sense that the system had been rendered safer and sounder and less likely to 
require taxpayer financed bail-outs in the future.  The second meaning relates 
to the question of whether banks have become better at serving the social and 
economic, or common, good and less short term profit oriented.   
This panel follows on from related panels organised by the MMF at GdRE 
conferences.  Two years ago, in Nantes, the panel focussed on the Eurozone 
crisis and considered how to break the ‘Doom Loop’ in (or ‘Spirale de la Dette’, 
Mullineux 2013a) where government (and thus taxpayer) insurance of troubled 
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banks, particularly the larger ones deemed ‘too big (to be allowed) to fail’, lead 
to a rise in the risk premiums on periphery government bonds. The major banks 
responded by ‘deleveraging’ and loading their balance sheets with bonds issued 
by their domestic governments and thus became increasingly exposed to 
government debts and their associated default risks; which required no capital 
backing under the new Basel III capital adequacy and liquidity requirements.   
In July 2012, after the conference ‘Super’ Mario Draghi, the President of the 
European and Central Bank (ECB) promised to do ‘whatever it takes’ to save the 
Eurozone and announced Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) that would 
allow the ECB to purchase bonds issued by governments that submitted to a 
financing package subject to conditions imposed by the funders.  OMT has yet 
to be used and indeed Ireland and Portugal successfully ‘exited’ in 2013/14 the 
rescue packages put together by ‘The Troika’ (the IMF, ECB and European 
Commission) earlier in the crisis. 
The 2013 GdRE panel in Poitiers discussed the problem of ‘Restoring the Bank 
Lending Channel’ (Mullineux, 2013b) amid ‘fragmentation’ of the money and 
capital markets in the Eurozone. Bond yields in the ‘periphery’ Eurozone 
countries were at an increasing premium to German ‘bunds’ and small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) and other companies in ‘the periphery’ faced 
considerably higher interest rates on loans from banks whilst SMEs in core 
countries, particularly Germany where the SMEs and ‘the Mittelstand’ remained 
well served by cooperative  and savings banks (Sparkassen). 
In the UK, HM Treasury (the Financial Ministry) and the Bank of England had 
jointly introduced a Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) in 2012,  which provided 
cheap finance to banks that extended new mortgages (home loans) and SME 
loans.  Meanwhile the ECB was operating its Long Term Refinancing Operation 
(LTRO) which gave the Eurozone banking system cheap access to abundant 
funds, much of which was re-deposited with the ECB and used to buy 
government bonds, rather than on-lent to SMEs. 
The UK’s FLS scheme was adjusted to remove funding mortgages in 2013,when a 
‘Help to Buy’ scheme was introduced as the housing market recovered, arguably 
too vigorously.  However, SME lending did not start to increase until the UK 
economy began to pick up speed after narrowly avoiding a ‘triple-dip’ recession in 
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spring 2013 (Armstrong, Davis et al, 2013). The SME focussed FLS scheme was 
extended in the UK government’s April 2014 budget. 
In early June 2014, two weeks before the Lyons conference, ‘Super’ Mario 
announced a ‘big bazooka’ initiative involving negative interest rates on deposits 
by banks with the ECB and Targeted LTROs (TLTROs), which consist of a 
package of £400bn fixed rate (0.25% initially rising to 0.5%) four year loans to 
banks that on-lend the borrowed money to SMEs.  Full details were yet to be 
revealed and the package consisted of other stimulatory monetary policy 
measures, including removal of the ‘sterilization’ of bond purchases by the ECB.  
The package aimed to address the problem of restoring, or reviving, the bank 
lending channel and also to discourage banks from depositing funds borrowed 
through the LTRO from the ECB, with the ECB, or using them to purchase 
domestic government bonds; bank holdings of which had continued to increase 
subsequent to the Poitiers conference two years previously. 
The ECB also announced plans to engage in ‘credit easing’ focussed on buying 
securities backed by receivables (interest and capital repayments) from 
packages of SME loans and to explore ways of re-invigorating the ‘securitised’ 
bond market that had collapsed, apart from the ‘covered bonds’ segment, after 
the GFC as a result of miss-pricing of risks in the mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) market and the related derivatives (Collateralized Debt Obligation, or 
CDO) market.  This policy is thus somewhat controversial and speculative, but is 
supported by other central banks, including the Bank of England. 
Another goal of the stimulus was to attempt to reverse the falling actual and 
expected inflation rate in the Eurozone, which is particularly problematic for 
periphery countries attempting to adjust through ‘internal devaluation’. 
If the package does not do the trick (and uptake of the TLTRO auction in 
September 2014 proved disappointing), and the German government support for 
it through its attempts to raise German real wages fails to ease pressure for 
reduced real wages in the periphery sufficiently, Mario Draghi has promised 
that the ECB is ‘not finished yet’; which means that Quantitative Easing (QE) 
through direct purchases of government bond issuance, hitherto anathema to 
the Bundesbank, may have to be employed to enhance the monetary stimulus, 
and weaken the euro against the US dollar, further. 
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For the banks, holding domestic government bonds has proved beneficial 
because falling risk premiums, and thus yields, after the July 2012 promise to 
‘do what it takes’ to save the Eurozone, resulted in capital gains on their bond 
holdings and made it cheaper for them to issue new bonds, including contingent 
convertible (‘Co-Co’) bonds that count towards Basel Tier 1 capital ratios.  The 
‘Doom Loop’ has been turned into a virtuous spiral and Spain, which averted the 
need for recourse to OMT and thus a conditional rescue package, was able to 
fund itself more cheaply in June 2014 than the US was able to! 
The Lyons 2014 panel met in light of a warning in the previous week, from 
Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the IMF, that housing bubbles were 
inflating in a number of countries and a warning from Mark Carney, Governor of 
the Bank of England, and George Osborne the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(Finance Minister) that (UK) house prices inflation was the biggest threat to 
financially stability in a UK economy experiencing accelerating growth. 
An increasingly robust recovery in the US was also raising the question of when 
and how fast interest rates should be raised towards more normal levels, or 
‘normalised’, once the liquidity stimulus through quantitative and credit easing 
had been terminated in October 2014. 
Residual worries about the robustness of the recovery in the UK and the US, 
given that levels of indebtedness remained at historically high levels, and below 
target inflation with falling expected inflation, have led to calls for postponing 
or progressing slowly with interest rate normalisation and instead using new, and 
largely untested, ‘macro-prudential’ policies to curb asset (including housing in 
the UK and junk bonds in the US) price inflations in order to prevent bubbles 
that tend to inflate following prolonged periods of ‘cheap money’. 
This suggested that the topic for the 2015 GdRE conference in Nice, should be: 
“Monetary Policy after the Financial Crisis: What will the ‘new normal’ be?” 
Meanwhile, the Eurozone was awaiting the outcome of the ECBs ‘Comprehensive 
Assessment’ of its banking system risks and capital adequacy. This consists of 
an ‘Asset Quality Review’ conducted by the ECB and bank balance sheet ‘stress 
tests’ conducted by the European Banking Authority ahead of the ECB, in 
conjunction with national supervisory authorities, taking over responsibility for 
banking supervision in November 2014. The resulting ‘Single Supervisory 
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Mechanism’ (SSM) is the first step towards forming a European Banking Union 
(Mullineux, 2014).   
Fragmentation in the Eurozone had declined substantially by June 2014, but 
non-performing loans (NPLs) in the periphery were still rising and there was a 
concern that they were being under-recorded and under-provisioned for.  
Harmonisation of the diverse methods of measuring and provisioning for NPLs is 
clearly required under the SSM. Much needs to be done to improve practice in 
light of the fact that Spain was widely regarded to have put in place an 
exemplary forward-looking provisioning policy prior to the crisis, but it provided 
to be inadequate following the onset of the crisis.  Recently accepted 
international accounting standards will facilitate forward looking ‘general’ 
provisioning.  Until these issues are addressed, and NPL rates decline, SMEs in 
the periphery can expect to face higher risk margins and thus borrowing costs, 
however strong the uptake of TLTRO turns out to be by their generally smaller, 
and less well capitalised, domestic banks.  Meanwhile, there is a concern that 
the Co-Co’s issued by the bigger European banks may turn out to have under-
priced the contingent risks.  
2. The Panel Discussion 
The first panellist to speak was E. Phillip Davis, currently working at Brunel 
University and a Research Fellow at the NIESR, who has previously worked for 
the Bank of England, from which he was seconded to the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI); which was the precursor to the ECB in Frankfurt.  Phil also 
currently works as Pastor of Penge Baptist Church, South London, and started 
by observing that Jesus said that “No one is good but God alone” (Matthew 
10:18), so, can banking be made good?  The charging of interest on debt was 
made permissible by Calvin under the ‘law of love’ and was previously permissible 
under Judaism, but does not comply with Islamic Sharia law, or the medieval 
Catholic view.  Nevertheless, rates on ‘payday loans’ and allegations of 
irresponsible, if not predatory lending to subprime customers, especially with 
regard to the US subprime home loans crisis that contributed to the GFC might 
be regarded as excessive, or ‘usurious’. 
Phil asked if the economic functions of banking: transfers of resources across 
time and geographical space; liquidity insurance; ‘delegated monitoring’ inter alia 
were being performed well. Was banking disruptive of the wider economy, and 
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what was wrong with banking?  He identified a number of problems areas.  Banks 
were lending inadequately to some sectors, such as SMEs (Armstong, Davis et al, 
2013), and excessively to others, such as housing and commercial property.  
There was also excessive risk taking through untested innovation beyond 
prudent levels.  Little account was taken of systemic, as opposed to individual, 
banking risks and there was herding behaviour at the sectorial level in banking 
and ‘disaster myopia’ and short term memories; resulting in the lessons of 
previous crises being forgotten by the banks and regulatory and supervisory 
authorities. 
In addition, there were incentive problems, with the ‘too big to fail’ problem 
creating a moral hazard leading to excessive risk taking by large banks.  
Further, the incentives in the pay and rewards structures, and particularly the 
bonus culture, led to excessive risk taking and short–term profit seeking 
behaviour. 
Banking crises are recurring events, as reviewed in Davis (1992, 1995), and 
warning signals were clear from case studies.  Favourable shocks, easing of 
entry conditions, innovations, debt accumulation, asset price booms, risk 
concentration, lower effective capital adequacy, and then a negative shock 
sparking a crisis. 
Is there a wider moral malaise reflected in this recurrence of banking crises, he 
asked? 
Phil then briefly reviewed recent empirical results, noting that SMEs face 
extreme credit rationing (Armstrong et al, 2013); banking crises have been 
preceded by property booms, current account weakness and low capital and 
liquidity of banks (Barrell et al, 2010) and a rise in off-balance sheet activity 
(Barrell et al 2013). Further a rise in banking competition raises the risk in 
banking (Davis and Karim, 2014), whilst risk taking increases with time since 
that last crisis (Craig et al, 2005) and large, and particularly more rapidly 
growing, banks, take on more risk (Barrell et al, 2011). 
Can banking be made better? One approach is better prudential regulation with 
more capital of the right sort (Tier 1, rather than Tier 2; which enhances risk 
taking) along with the new and justified attention to liquidity requirements 
under Basel III. 
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Product regulation should perhaps require stricter testing of innovations before 
they are widely marketed, as with pharmaceutical drugs.  There would be a 
problem of preventing innovation being taken up by the offshore and shadow 
banking markets, however! 
As regards market structure, larger, too big to fail, banks have a greater 
incentive to take risks than smaller ones, increasing their contribution to 
systemic riskiness.  Breaking up the big and complex, systemically important, 
banks might be preferable to ‘ring fencing’ core retail and utility banking 
activities, as proposed in the UK.  Would a bigger role for mutual banks such as 
credit unions, as proposed in the UK, help?  Phil noted that the de-mutualised 
UK building societies all failed as a result of GFC, while the remaining large 
mutual, Nationwide, remained solid. 
Phil argued that regulators had hitherto paid insufficient attention to 
incentives in finance, such as those presented by opportunities to arbitrage, or 
circumvent, regulations. Is a regular assessment of incentives as a background 
for regulatory enhancement required?  Can banks’ reward structures be 
adjusted to promote ‘long termism’?   
Abrupt changes in competition should be avoided and necessary reforms should 
be gradually introduced, he argued.  Particular attention should be paid to the 
behaviour and viability of new entrants and financial firms granted new powers; 
such as the demutualised building societies being allowed to lend outside the 
housing market after the 1986 Building Societies Act. 
Competition in SME lending needed to be encouraged in the UK, where the four 
biggest banks dominate the market, whilst too much competition in the home 
loans market had led to excessive and complex product differentiation in the 
run up to the GFC.  There was perhaps need for a a greater role for loan 
guarantees in SME lending and the use of macro-prudential policy to calm the 
frothy home loan market. 
As regards macro-prudential policy, the key focus should be on property lending 
and property prices, but there should also be a focus on incentives and the 
dynamics of competition.  Given the political reality, how easy will it be for 
central banks to ‘take away the punch bowl’ whilst the party is getting under 
way? 
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The presence of disaster myopia and memory loss calls for rules, rather than 
the discretion implied by macro-prudential policy, as it is currently envisaged. 
Finally, Phil addressed ethical issues relating to the topic (Davis, 2012).  He 
considered whether formal regulation might be overly technical and whether it 
should be simplified and complemented by regulation that encouraged more 
basic ‘values’ to serve as benchmarks for behaviour.  Regulatory arbitrage and 
avoidance through innovation might be reduced by a form of regulation 
forbidding actions against the spirit, rather than the letter, of the regulations.  
Such ‘principals- based’ regulation might be less open to legal challenges.  To 
avoid regulation that promotes values turning into pious lists and a ‘box-ticking’ 
exercise, that is otherwise ignored or circumvented or pushed into the shadow 
banking sector, a crucial complement is the inculcation of ‘virtues’ (like honesty, 
prudence, courage, justice, trustworthiness and diligence) that promote the 
internal conviction of what behaviour is right, along with the determination to 
follow it through with actions for which bankers take personal responsibility. 
Phil believed the most important virtue in this context was prudence – ‘the 
perfect ability of individuals possessing freedom and free will to make morally 
correct practical decisions’ e.g. using experience, data and judgement in the 
granting of credit (Gregg, 2010).  Virtues can be promoted through the example 
set by senior management, such as Stephen Green, the former Chairman of 
HSBC (Green, 2009), and appropriately adjusted rewards and incentives.  In the 
wider Judeo-Christian ethical framework, these entail responsibility as 
stewards of creation and ultimate answerability to God on the Day of 
Judgement. 
Virtues cannot be relied upon alone, however, since values, and particularly 
regulations are enforceable, whilst virtues are not, but: a “financial system that 
neither promotes nor rewards such virtues has the seeds of its own 
destruction” (Davis, 2012). 
A balance thus needed to be struck between institutional blame and personal 
responsibility and the regulatory authorities are struggling to find the balance 
in fining banking institutions and some traders, as opposed to management, for 
misconduct.  The burden of proof for individual prosecution is higher whilst a 
bank can often pass the costs of the fines onto their shareholders and 
customers; at least until they respond negatively. The ultimate responsibility 
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for risk management, pricing and control lies with senior management and the 
shareholder stewards.  UK regulators seem increasingly seem to be requiring 
senior management to take greater responsibility for the actions of their 
employees. 
The second panellist to speak was Peter Sinclair of the University of 
Birmingham.  ‘Evil is the root of all money’, it has been alleged (Moore (with 
Kyotaki), 2001) he noted, as he warmed to the topic, asking: good for welfare, 
but whose welfare?  Good morally?  Good for GDP growth?  Or, good in the 
sense of repaired, or safer, with economies (and taxpayers) better protected?   
Barclays, HSBC, Standard Chartered and Nationwide were arguably good banks 
in the sense that they weathered the GFC well and prospered since, though not 
without challenges, including US fines for money laundering misdemeanours and 
a slowdown in S.E. Asian economies has more recently taken the shine off the 
performances of HSBC and Standard Chartered, and HSBC had also become 
embroiled in UK miss-selling and interbank and exchange rate scandals that 
emerged after the GFC. But in the North East of England, excessive lending 
funded by short term money market loans plunged Northern Rock into the first 
bank run in Britain for 160 years in August 2007 and 14 months later, its 
Yorkshire neighbours, Bradford and Bingley Building Society and the Halifax 
component of HBOS suffered insolvency for similar reasons.. 
To the North, in Scotland, still greater disasters were to follow the Northern 
Rock debacle. The Dunfermline Building Society entered into administration in 
March 2009; HBOS, parent of the Bank of Scotland, as part of HBOS, had to 
be acquired Lloyds TSB at the government’s behest in October 2008; and RBS, 
the Royal Bank of Scotland, briefly the world’s biggest bank after some high 
risk takeovers, was, like Lloyds, unable to survive without a heavy infusion of 
capital by the government and was all but nationalised; with the government 
ending up with a shareholding of 82%. 
Diversity in banking is clearly important and it is now clear that the GFC was 
more a US or North Atlantic (excluding Canada) crisis, and not crisis affecting 
Asia, Australia, Africa and Latin America.  Hence it was not a truly ‘Global’ 
financial crisis, and consequently it is now frequently referred to as the ‘Great’ 
Financial Crisis to reflect its magnitude as a huge earthquake, with its epicentre 
in the North Atlantic, that was followed by the ‘Great Recession’. 
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Good or better for whom?   UK households with mortgages have gained at the 
expense of depositors and savers. Employees have not done well since the GFC 
because real wages have fallen and depositors and savers have suffered low 
nominal and negative real interest rates, and SMEs have confronted intensified 
credit rationing, or a ‘credit crunch’.  Shareholders have not done particularly 
well either, although the shareholders in banks were often protected in bail- 
outs and the stock markets began to recover in March 2009 and have 
subsequently boomed as central banks pumped liquidity into the banking system, 
held interest rates at record lows, and encouraged a ‘reach for yield’.  Bankers 
pay and bonuses held up surprisingly well, however, although there were 
considerable job losses in the sector! The cost of protecting the UK economy 
from the consequences of a systemic banking failure was a need for fiscal 
consolidation or ‘austerity’. 
Outside the UK, there has been considerable variation in the pace, character 
and scale of legislation and official action to restore banking systems to health. 
Action in the US was particularly prompt in the form first of the Troubled 
Assets Relief Program (TARP) in October 2010, which injected federal funds 
into major banks and other financial institutions and the late 2010 Dodd-Frank 
Act, which included the ‘Volcker Rule’ limiting proprietary trading that was 
finalised and incorporated in the Act in 2014. In contrast, Ireland’s government 
guaranteed all its bank bondholders in September 2008, raising its national debt 
by a third of its GDP. Following the onset of the Greek debt crisis in May 2010, 
a government debt crisis ensued in the Eurozone periphery countries affecting 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain, as well as Greece, and later Cyprus and Slovenia. 
Has it got better?  Is it getting better?  Regulators have been very busy 
behaving like swans moving serenely across the water whilst paddling furiously 
below the surface. 
As Japan had done previously, the Eurozone elected to adopt the ‘option value 
of waiting’, rather than forcing early balance sheet restructuring on banks, in 
the hope that the problem would go away. Under the new government of Shinzo 
Abe, Japan finally adopted aggressive quantitative easing in 2013. The Eurozone 
had not yet followed suite due to German opposition.  Having forced banks to 
re-capitalise using state funds through TARP, the US authorities followed up 
with fairly aggressive stress testing, both of which  restricted banks’ ability to 
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pay dividends, and to a lesser extent bonuses, whilst capital adequacy was raised 
to increasingly higher levels prescribed by tightening regulations. 
With the exception of the Volcker Rule, there has been little consideration of 
further structural reforms in US banking.  The UK’s Vickers Report (2013) 
recommended the ‘ring fencing’ of retail and some commercial banking activities 
in the UK, and the EU’s Liikanen Report (2012) had also proposed structural 
reforms; but these have yet to be fully implemented and banks have lobbied 
strongly to limit their restrictiveness.  Implementation of a full separation of 
commercial and investment banking, as in the US Glass-Steagall Act (1933), is 
not proposed and nor is the breaking up of banks deemed too big or 
interconnected to be allowed to fail. Such systemically important financial 
institutions, mainly banks, or SIFIs, will continue to pose systemic risks.   
Some protection to taxpayers is offered by the EU policy of ‘bailing-in’ bank 
creditors, other than guaranteed depositors, before taxpayers’ money is 
committed to bail-outs. However, bank resolution regimes, especially those 
involving cross-border banks, remain far from finished business.  Large complex, 
’universal’ banks have also failed to produce the convincing ‘living wills’ that are 
needed to make ring fencing a reality 
There have been proposals in the EU for a Financial Transaction Tax to throw 
‘sand in the wheels’ of financial trading, as advocated by Tobin (1978) and the 
IMF has proposed  a Financial Activity Tax (FAT) on bonuses plus profits to 
serve as an aggregate Value Added Tax (VAT) on big banks.  Individual countries 
have instead introduced special bank levies, and the EU is now proposing that a 
Eurozone-wide bank levy is used to fund combined resolution and deposit 
guarantee funds for its banking union, which is also work in progress (Chaudhry 
et al, 2014). The view from City of London is that such taxes should be globally 
implemented to assure a level playing field.  
As regards bankers’ bonuses, there has been some success in reining them in 
and introducing ‘claw backs’, but salaries have been raised to some extent in 
compensation.  Further, the legality of claw backs and the need for re-
imbursement of losses make them difficult to implement, so that deferral of 
bonuses is perhaps a better option. 
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The UK financial sector has continued to get caught up in mis-selling and cartel 
price rigging scandals post crisis and peripheral parts of the sector, such as 
pay-day lenders, have increasingly looked predatory as they take on subprime 
borrowers shunned by banks.  Justin Welby, the Archbishop of Canterbury, is 
trying to help Credit Unions (small mutual banks) to compete for subprime 
lending business by making Parish Churches available for them to provide 
services and encouraging churches to set up their own.  The government too is 
promoting the expansion of credit unions, but it is unclear that they really want 
to take on subprime members. 
Fiscal neutrality is required between equity and bond issuance.  There is 
currently bias towards loans and bond (debt) issuance since the interest 
(coupon) payments are tax deductible, unlike dividend payments on equity.  
Removal of tax deductibility would however be problematic for SMEs, which 
remain largely bank, and thus debt, dependent and have little access to equity 
financing outside the target areas of venture funds, such as high tech growth 
firms.  Islamic-style ‘profit and loss sharing’ financing might possibly provide an 
alternative approach to SME funding. 
The ‘zero lower bound’ of nominal interest rates has proved problematic as it 
tends to compress the spread, or margin, between loan and deposit rates; 
making it difficult for banks to profit from traditional commercial banking 
business and leading them to seek fee earning underwriting, broking and asset 
management, and also trading profits. 
Bankruptcy procedures had shown inadequate forbearance.  You cannot get 
‘blood out of a stone’ – more debt forgiveness should have been granted to 
debtors to help resolve the US housing crisis, especially to subprime debtors, 
Peter argued.  There is evidence that the banks have been keener to resolve the 
larger debts of households with bigger mortgages and more valuable houses in 
order to meet the targets set by the relevant US government regulatory agency 
for debt forgiveness more easily. 
The apportionment of risk needed to be more efficiently distributed – who 
should bear the risk and associated losses in bad states?  The relative seniority 
of creditors must be clearly delineated and apportionment of the claims of 
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cross-border creditors clearly identified.  The problem of ‘hold-out’ creditors 
impeding efficient resolution, as in the case of Argentina, must also be resolved. 
The ‘too big to fail’ problem also remains to be fully resolved, if indeed it can be 
whilst some banks remain too systemically important to be allowed to fail.  
Without a resolution to this problem, market capitalism cannot operate 
effectively because the allocation of capital becomes distorted. 
Peter concluded that banking was a little bit better than immediately before 
and after the GFC, but there was a long way to go before it was fully restored 
to health – it was on the road to recovery, but the recovery was still very much 
‘work in progress’ because deleveraging would be very slow and little progress 
had been made in reviving lending to SMEs.  Further, other than the recipients, 
few thought that large bankers’ bonuses were warranted or ‘good’ in any sense. 
Attempts to cap or reduce them had met with limited success, and the efficacy 
of required imposition of deferrals and the potentiality of ‘claw backs’ in the UK 
had yet to be proven or tested. The hope is that they will discourage excessive 
risk taking and the pursuit of short term returns (Sinclair et al, 2009).  
The third speaker was Karen Braun–Munzinger who works on prudential policy at 
the Bank of England.  At the outset, Karen made it clear that the points she 
would make were her own thoughts and should not be taken as reflecting the 
views of the Bank of England. 
Karen noted that there had been significant progress already, but that we were 
too early in the policy cycle to judge actual outcomes given that policies had not 
yet been fully implemented and thus to assess whether or not we were “making 
banking good” Banking regulatory authorities, including the Bank of England in 
the UK, were well advanced in implementing a massive reform agenda decided 
upon by the G20 and aim to complete the reform effort in a number of key 
areas at the G20 meeting in Brisbane in November 2014.  However, policy 
decisions and consequent legislation are not equivalent to full implementation.  
In order to make the transition viable, reforms would come into force gradually 
over the coming years. 
Karen asked where these reforms are heading and considered whether they will 
lead us to a better place.  Have we made banking regulation good?  There has 
been important progress in making the banking system safer already.  But we 
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could not stop at this point: not only were final pieces of the policy agenda yet 
to be considered, but also a critical task of implementation and so we would 
need to come back to consider the question , once all relevant measures had 
been fully implemented. 
As one potential measure of ‘goodness’, Karen suggested looking at public 
opinion, noting the bad press banking  - and other financial sector actors – had 
received as a result of the  GFC Prior to the crisis, bankers’ reputations were 
apparently not interesting to pollsters and were often not included in the list of 
professions.  Post GFC, a YouGov tracker found 73% of its respondents said the 
industry ‘had a bad reputation’, which puts them towards the bottom of the 
distribution.  Even though they didn’t top the reputational tables, the trust and 
confidence of the public in UK banks reached an all-time high in the run up to 
the GFC, and then nosedived after the crisis. Thus, public opinion may not be 
the best guide for judging whether the banking sector is behaving in a way that 
is favourable, or good, for the economy.  Trust in banks had after all been 
increasing over the same period as banking risks were, with hindsight, 
accumulating. 
Karen suggested we could think of another measure of achieving ‘good banking’ 
as moving towards a situation where incentives and the ability of banks to take 
risks are more supportive of what is prudentially optimal.  Banking is closely 
linked to economic growth.  The banking system provides payments services, 
financial intermediation and facilitates insurance, but the combination of these 
with potential fragility can make banking the source of costly crises. 
Major banking crises are often followed by deeper recessions, with larger losses 
of output relative to the prevailing trend than ‘normal’ recessions.  The main 
cost of crisis is not the costs to the taxpayer of bank ‘bail-outs’, though these 
may already be substantial, but the potential for post crisis recession and 
associated credit crunch, de-leveraging and increased unemployment. 
Once the crisis has been staunched and the banking and wider financial system 
has been stabilised, the aim should be to put the financial system into a better 
position to reduce the incidence and depth of future crises by establishing 
better standards for banks and other financial firms, better tools for the 
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regulatory and supervising authorities and by removing distortionary incentives 
to take excessive risk. 
The GFC revealed that banks were not resilient because they did not have 
sufficient capital and liquidity reserves.  Further, the system was not robust 
enough to cope with increasing inter-connectedness within the banking and 
wider financial systems.  Also, banks had grown so large, complex and inter-
connected that they became too big or systemically important (to be allowed) to 
fail and so governments had to bail them out using taxpayers money. 
It is thus particularly important that the problem posed by systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs) (mainly, but not exclusively, banks) is 
resolved.  Perceptions that such firms might be bailed out could lead to moral 
hazard, reducing the ability of smaller and generally less complex banks to 
compete effectively with them. This could lead them to become yet bigger and 
more dominant.   
Policy makers have responded by reforming the existing prudential framework 
and, in particular, addressing systemic macro-prudential thinking more explicitly.  
Such a systemic view will help ensure that regulators do not simply swap one 
problem for another. The regulatory framework is changing to respond to these 
systemic risks, by aiming to reduce both the probability and impact of failures 
by both enhancing capital and liquidity adequacy and by removing adverse 
incentives. 
There is also work under way to increase  the diversity of market based funding 
for borrowers and reduce barriers to entry and expansion for smaller 
(‘challenger’) banking. 
Basel III induces an explicit macro-prudential instrument, the counter cyclical 
capital buffer and international accounting standards have been amended to 
allow forward looking ‘general’ provisioning against bad and doubtful debts, 
particularly non-performing loans.  In addition, Sifis are subject to enhanced 
capital adequacy requirements and the wider usage of leverage ratios by 
regulators limits their ability to leverage their capital by employing favourable 
risk weighting. 
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To manage the impact of failure and the TBTF problem, complementary reforms 
to ‘bank resolution’ regimes are required.  As with other reforms, Karen 
believed that a lot of progress had been made, but final policy questions had to 
be settled and new measures implemented. In particular, orderly resolution 
without exposing taxpayers to losses  needed sufficient liabilities capable of 
absorbing losses In another words, there needed to be sufficient ‘gone concern 
loss absorbing capacity’ (or GLAC), in the right form at the right time and in the 
right place to allow a bank to be safely resolved. Equally, the necessary 
agreements for cross border recognition of resolution actions regarding 
contractual stays had to be put in place.  The Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) are leading the 
work in progress in this sphere. 
Karen acknowledged that she had talked about achievements and gaps on the 
policy front, but what did it all mean for the question of whether banks were 
getting better? 
Though implementation is not yet complete, there has been progress towards 
making the banking sector more resilient.  Big banks in the UK and elsewhere 
now hold a great deal more capital than they did before the crisis.  ‘Disclosure’ 
had been increased in both quantity and quality. TBTF incentive distortions were 
decreasing, as evidenced by credit rating agencies removing the rating uplifts 
resulting from market expectations of government bail-out support for banks. 
Other policy issues remained to be resolved, however, and the final judgement 
must await full and consistent international implementation.  
Karen concluded that there was a lot to feel good about: the clear recognition 
of the importance of a system-wide perspective along-side institution-specific 
regulation; lots of progress in agreeing new policies with regard to capital and 
liquidity adequacy as well as other reforms; and a clear roadmap for completion 
in areas where further work is needed; but it all needed to be implemented 
coherently and with mutual international trust. 
Finally, the new regulatory and supervisory regime will need to be responsive to 
new risks as they emerge and sufficiently flexible to deal with new fault lines or 
shocks! 
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The 4th and final panellist to speak was Laurent Clerc, who is in charge of the 
Financial Stability directorate at the Banque de France.  Laurent asked whether 
the intention had indeed been to make banking good and felt that this was 
surely the case for the public and the politicians they had elected.  There had 
been a strong negative reaction against the past actions of banks and banking.  
The sense of injustice in the public had been fuelled by the large taxpayer 
support and ‘outrageous compensations’ in the banking industry.  There was a 
widespread view that bankers had privatised their gains and mutualised their 
losses. 
In the political context, a ‘good bank’ makes loans to the real economy; does not 
engage in speculation activities; does not put the whole economic system at risk; 
accurately aligns compensation to risks; and is not too-big-to-fail, but is instead 
resolvable.  This may require structural reforms along the lines proposed by 
Vickers, Volcker, Liikanen (and Barnier) and related French proposals to 
separate retail and utility banking activities from risky and speculative activity; 
and aggressive litigation against bankers and/or banks in order to achieve a 
sense of justice and to act as a deterrent against future excessive risk taking 
in pursuit of profit and personal gain. 
From the perspective of the regulators, the objective is somewhat different.  
Their aim is to build more resilient financial institutions and systems, in order 
to address systemic risks by combining micro and macro prudential perspectives.  
This implies that banks should be better and more highly capitalised; have 
greater liquidity coverage and reserves; be less leveraged; and not take too 
much risk; and be resolvable in an orderly manner.  The aim is increasingly to 
build general loss-absorbing capacity (GLAC) and reduce the risk of contagion, 
whilst not impeding credit supply unduly.  Regulators also think about structural 
reforms, but with very different approaches across jurisdictions and much to 
be done with regard to aligning compensation risks. 
Laurent next considered whether the objectives of the politicians and the 
regulators were consistent, and concluded that, to a certain extent they were, 
but: regulatory initiatives and reforms may have detrimental effects if the cost 
of credit in the short run; were too dismissive of potentially ‘good’ 
securitisation, as opposed to the  ‘bad’ (complex and mispriced) securitisation 
often linked to derivatives, such Collateralised Debt Obligations, or CDOs that 
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had proved so damaging in the GFC; and negatively impact on long term finance, 
an issue under consideration by the FSB. 
There appeared to be a particular problem with regard to access to affordable 
finance by SMEs and the Basel Committee and the International Organisation of 
Securities Organisations (IOSCO) had been considering ways of re-invigorating 
good securitisation.  As noted earlier, the UK’s FLS scheme and the ECB’s new 
TLTRO scheme aim at providing cheap financing to banks that on-lend to SMEs.  
More reliance on loan guarantees might also be considered, in line with Paul 
Mizen’s suggestions in last year’s panel (Mullineux, 2013b), it can be noted. 
Finally, Laurent asked what the outcome might be?  He considered that in the 
near future, banks may not be ‘good’, but they surely will be different as a 
result of: far reaching changes in the incentive structure of the whole financial 
industry due to regulatory reforms; and changes in the corporate governance of 
banks, as a consequence of new resolution regimes involving bail-ins.   
However, currently proposed bail-ins, resolution and GLAC procedures may in 
fact result in bigger, rather than smaller, institutions; and banks have already 
started to adapt their business models to become less dependent as wholesale 
funding and more reliant on guaranteed depositors, whilst a major restructuring 
of universal banks and investment banks is underway, with potential negative 
side effects on market making capacity. 
Hence there were trade-offs and the devil was indeed in the detail, so that 
‘unintended consequences’, might yet to be revealed as the regulatory reforms 
are progressively implemented in the coming years.  There may, for example, be 
an incentive for SIFIs to become much larger once the threshold for becoming 
a SIFI is crossed, in order to spread the relatively fixed regulatory costs and 
so an oligopolistic market structure may emerge internationally. 
Price Fishback (University of Arizona and National Bureau of Economic 
Research, NBER) a keynote speaker on issues arising from the escape from the 
crisis, following the 1929 Great Crash, in the 1930 and 1940s at the conference 
managed to squeeze in a question before the panel adjourned for the Gala 
Dinner!  He asked whether lessons from the past might be a guide to the sort of 
banks we want in the future? 
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Andy Mullineux, the chair responded by saying that we probably do not want a 
bank managed by the fictitious Captain George Mainwaring from the popular UK 
television series ‘Dad’s Army’ (the British Home Guard during the 1939-45 war). 
British banks at the time primarily served the professional and upper middle 
classes.  A better model might be the fictitious mutual ‘Bailey Buildings and Loan 
Association’ run by George Bailey in the favourite US Christmas movie: “It’s a 
Wonderful Life”, made in 1946.  George Bailey reluctantly stuck with the 
management of the Buildings and Loan Association, whilst the town’s 
shareholder-owned commercial bank manager (Henry F. Potter) repeatedly tried 
to force it out of business, but failed despite sparking a run on the mutual and 
alleging embezzlement of its funds.   
In that story, the mutual was the good community bank, and so perhaps what we 
need is a more ‘level playing field’ that allows mutual banks to prosper. There is 
a concern that the new regulations are primarily designed to make shareholder-
owned banks safer, especially the big ones, but may squeeze out smaller mutual 
banks, and with it the community and relationship banking that so benefits 
households and SMEs in the US, Germany and elsewhere.  At minimum, diversity 
in banking should be preserved and excessive bigness and complexity in banking 
avoided, for evidence or economy of sale, and especially scope, is mixed and 
ongoing changes in information technology may well favour smaller banks and 
niche internet-based specialists.  It may be that the relatively fixed costs of 
regulators compliance are unintentionally creating countervailing incentives for 
banks to seek bigness. 
There is also a growing realisation that the old partnership structure, involving 
unlimited liability, that was prevalent in the merchant banking and broking and 
dealing that preceded modern limited liability investment banking, may have 
better aligned management responsibility with risk taking.  Willingness to accept 
bonuses should be associated with responsibility for risk taking and compensate 
structures, regulatory fines and criminal prosecution should perhaps reflect 
this. 
3) Conclusions 
The overall conclusion of the Lyon panel’s discussions was that: whilst regulatory 
reform was underway and broadly on track, the international consistency of 
implementation was far from assured and that the ‘too big to fail’ problem had 
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not been resolved through structural reforms. Indeed, post crisis consolidation 
had increased concentration in banking markets and an unintended consequence 
of crossing the regulatory threshold to become a systemically important 
financial institution (SIFI) might be to encourage them to accelerate their 
growth in order to spread their additional regulatory costs.  
There was also a feeling that diversity in banking was beneficial and that mutual 
and community banking should be preserved and not permitted to be squeezed 
out by an evolving regulatory regime which is primarily designed to protect 
taxpayers by controlling the systemic risks posed by large and complex 
shareholder-owned banks.  
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